Inference rules are derived for proving partial correctness of concurrent programs that use message passing. These rules extend the notion of a satisfaction proof, first proposed for proving correctness of programs that use synchronous message-passing, to asynchronous message-passing, rendezvous, and remote procedures. Two types of asynchronous message-passing are considered: unreliable datagrams and reliable virtual circuits. The proof rules show how interference can arise and be controlled.
INTRODUCTION
Message passing provides a way for concurrent processes to communicate and synchronize. In this paper, proof rules are developed for a variety of messagepassing primitives. Two benefits accrue from this. The obvious one is that partial correctness proofs can be written for concurrent programs that use such primitives. This allows these programs to be understood as predicate transformers [6] or invariant maintainers 1 [16] , instead of by contemplating all possible execution interleavings. The second benefit is that the proof rules shed light on how interference arises when message-passing operations are used and on how this interference can be controlled. This provides insight into techniques to control interference in programs that involve asynchronous activity.
Our work is based on an approach first proposed by Levin and Gries [17] for proving communicating sequential processes (CSP) [13] programs correct. By extending and applying their notion of a satisfaction proof, we have been able to derive proof rules for a variety of communications primitives, including asynchronous message-passing with unreliable datagrams and with reliable virtual circuits, rendezvous, and remote procedures. Moreover, the approach appears to be quite general and therefore could be used to obtain proof rules for other message-passing statements, as well.
In Section 2 we briefly review CSP and satisfaction proofs. In Section 3, proof rules for communications primitives of networks supporting unreliable datagrams [23] are derived. In Section 4, we consider communications primitives of networks that support reliable virtual circuits. Section 5 contains proof rules for rendezvous primitives and remote procedures. Finally, Section 6 discusses related work and Section 7 contains conclusions.
SYNCHRONOUS MESSAGE-PASSING AND SATISFACTION PROOFS

CSP
A CSP program P is a collection of processes P1, P2 ..... Pn:
P :: [P1 [[ P2 II "" II P,]-
Processes are executed concurrently; they communicate and synchronize solely by using input and output commands.
An input command
inp: A?var in process B matches an output command out: B !expr in process A if the type of expr and vat are the same. Input and output commands are always executed synchronously in matching pairs, so each has the potential to delay its invoker. This is called synchronous message-passing, in contrast to asynchronous message-passing where the sender is not delayed. Execution of a pair of input and output commands is equivalent to the assignment var := expr.
Thus, a matching pair of input and output commands implements a distributed assignment statement.
In CSP, a communications command can appear in the guard of a selection or iteration command. 2 This allows a process to wait for the occurrence of any one of a number of events. A guard consists of a Boolean expression/~, which involves only program variables accessible to the process in which the guard appears, and 
A Proof System for CSP
Proofs in the programming logic for CSP described in [17] involve three steps.
First, each process is annotated with assertions, giving a sequential proof. Then, assumptions made in the sequential proof about the effects of receiving messages are validated by performing a satisfaction proof. This involves constructing a collection of satisfaction formulas and proving them to be valid. Finally, noninterference [21] is established to ensure that execution of each process cannot invalidate assertions that appear in the sequential proof of another. The sequential proof for each process is obtained using a sequential programming logic (such as that in [12] ) along with axioms for communications commands (described below). Thus, each process is viewed as a sequential program in isolation. In a sequential proof, the assertion immediately preceding a statement S is called the precondition of S and is denoted pre(S); the assertion following S is called the postcondition of S and is denoted post(S).
Free variables in assertions are either program variables or auxiliary variables [4] . For simplicity, distinct variables are assumed to have distinct names. Program variables can appear only in statements in processes that have access to the memory in which those variables are stored. 4 However, any variable can be named in assertions in the sequential proof of any process; this permits the states of different processes to be correlated.
The axiom for an input command inp is
Input CommandAxiom. {P} inp:A?var {R}, and the axiom for an output command out is Output Command Axiom. {Q} out: B!expr {U}.
Each allows anything to appear as its postcondition; in the parlance of [6] , the axioms violate the "Law of the Excluded Miracle." However, this is not a problem.
When executed in isolation, a communications command cannot terminate, and so the soundness of the axioms for sequential proofs follows. ~ A satisfaction proof will impose further restrictions on the postconditions of communications commands so that soundness is preserved even when communications commands do terminate.
Note that communications commands in guards can be treated in the same way as other communications commands if deadlock is not of concern. Consider the guarded commands b; com ---) S 3 Following [17] , we do not adopt Hoare's convention of having a guard containing a communications command to be false if the process named in that communication command has terminated. 4 In CSP, program variables that can be altered by one process may not be accessed by concurrently executed processes. However, the proof systems described in this paper can be used to reason about programs in which there are shared variables as well as message passing. We exploit this in Section 4. 5 Recall that this is a partial correctness logic. The only difference between these is that the latter is more prone to deadlock than the former [17] . Since termination and deadlock are not reflected in a proof system for partial correctness, it is always possible to "translate" a program from one form to the other for the purposes of constructing a proof of partial correctness. A way to adapt such a proof for proving absence of deadlock is given in [17] . In order to understand the obligations for establishing satisfaction, consider matching pair of communications commands inp and out. According to the communications axioms, their execution will leave the system in a state in which R h U is true. Since execution of the matching pair is equivalent to executing var := expr, it suffices for execution to be started in a state that satisfies wp("var := expr", R h U) to ensure that the desired postcondition will result [6] . However, the communications axioms stipulate that P h Q is true of the state immediately before the assignment is made. Thus, the truth of the postconditions of a matching pair of communications commands is ensured if This ensures that the postconditions of communications commands in a sequential proof are true whenever those communications commands terminate.
The third and final step of the proof is to show noninterference. This is necessary because assertions in the proof of one process can refer to variables changed by another. 7 In order to combine the proofs of a collection of processes that will be executed concurrently, it is therefore necessary to show that execution of no process invalidates the proof of another.
An assertion I and atomic action S are parallel if S is contained in one process and I is contained in the proof of another. A statement is an atomic action if it involves at most one reference to at most one shared variable. To establish noninterference, it must be shown that execution of every atomic action S parallel to I does not make I false. We say that S does not interefere with I if NI~ynch(S, I): {I h pre(S)} S {I} is a theorem in the programming logic. Thus, noninterference is established by proving that no assignment or communications command interferes with any assertion parallel to it.
• R.D. Schlichting and F. B. Schneider
For an input command S, the proof that NIsynch(S, I) is a theorem follows trivially from the Input Command Axiom. However, satisfaction must then be established to ensure the truth of the postcondition of NIsy,c,(S, I). This is done by showing that for every output command out that matches input command S and that is parallel to I, the following satisfaction formula is valid. ivar NI-Sat~ynch(S, out, I): (I A pre(S) A pre(out)) ~ e~r.
NI_Sat~ynch is obtained from Sat~y,ch by substituting I A pre(S)-for P, pre(out) for Q, I for R, and true for U. Proving this formula valid corresponds to showing that executing the distributed assignment implemented by communication commands S and out does not invalidate an assertion I in a third process.
Similarly, for S an output command NIsy~ch(S, I) is a theorem, but satisfaction must be established. This is done by showing that NI_Sat~y~ch(inp, S, I) is valid for every input command inp that matches output command S and that is parallel to an assertion I in a third process. Thus, noninterference is established by proving
CSP Noninterference Proof
For every atomic action S and assertion I parallel to S, prove NIsy,¢h(S, I). For every input command Si,, and matching output command So,t, and every assertion I parallel to Si,, and So,t, prove NI-Sat~ynCh(Sinp, So,t, I) valid.
The following inference rule then allows proofs of processes to be combined. It is unlikely that such a receive would actually be implemented. The expense and complexity of "peeking" at the contents of delivered messages in order to evaluate fl~TZXT is tOO high. On the other hand, the use of/~ does make it possible to model a variety of communications primitives, such as receive statements, in which strong-typing of the target variable and the message is enforced at run time, and receive statements for named channels. Thus, considering this more general receive is sensible.
Concurrent
Proof Rules
Following the approach outlined in Section 2, a program proof involves three steps: a sequential proof, a satisfaction proof, and a noninterference proof. The proof obligations for each of these steps--including axioms for send and receive, the satisfaction formula for these primitives, and the noninterference satisfaction formula--are now described.
The state of the system includes information about messages that have been sent but not received, since this can influence execution. In order to model this aspect of the state, two auxiliary variables are associated with each process D. Thus, post(r) will be true when r terminates provided (3. NIa~yn~h(S, I): {I A pre(S)} S {I} about every assertion I and every assignment, send, and receive statement S parallel to it. For S a receive in process D, NI~ynCh(S, I) follows trivially from the Unreliable Datagram Receive Axiom, but it is necessary to prove satisfaction. The necessary satisfaction formula NI_Sat~y,¢h(S, I) is obtained by substituting into Satasynch(r) based on NIasynch(S,/)--that is, using I h pre(S) for pre(r) and I for Q. This results in:
In summary, to establish noninterference
Unreliable Datagrams Noninterference Proof
For every assignment and send statement S and every assertion I parallel to S, prove NI~y,¢h(S, I).
For every receive S and every assertion I parallel to S, prove NI_Sat~y~¢h(S, I) valid.
Disciplines to Simplify Establishing Satisfaction
Some general techniques that allow satisfaction to be established trivially are now illustrated by means of a series of examples.
Consider the following distributed program, where process A sends a message to process D. 
The consequent is equivalent to true, so the formula is valid and satisfaction is shown. Noninterference follows trivially: no assertion in the sequential proof of one process contains a variable modified by another. Now suppose post(r) is changed to reflect the fact that the value of the message received is 16: The sequential proof is still valid--according to the Unreliable Datagram Receive Axiom, anything can be asserted after a receive. The new satisfaction formula for r is:
This is not valid. Without changing post(r), there are two options:
(1) Strengthen/~ (by using "m = 16" for ~) so that the resulting satisfaction formula would be valid. (2) Strengthen pre(r) so that the resulting satisfaction formula would be valid.
Option (1) certainly guarantees that only a message with value 16 will be received. However, this should not be necessary, because only a message with value 16 is sent. Let us pursue option (2) .
First, note that if some assertion I is an invariant of a program, then I can be used to strengthen the assertions in a valid sequential proof of that program and the result will remain a valid sequential proof. This forms the basis of a general strategy:
General Strategy for Establishing Satisfaction. Strengthen assertions by adding an invariant of the program as a conjunct to every assertion. By suitable choice of the invariant, the new satisfaction formula can be proved valid.
This strategy is exploited, as follows. Define
Iv~ls is an invariant of process A; it is true initially (aD = ¢) and, using the Send Axiom, we find that its truth before execution of s implies its truth after. Since Iv~s is not interfered with by any statement in D, it is also an invariant of the entire concurrent program. After strengthening assertions in D with Iw~, the new satisfaction formula for r is 
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This formula is valid, so satisfaction is established. Noninterference follows trivially, as before. Clearly, the trick was to find a suitable invariant. (This is analogous to a standard technique used when attempting to perform a noninterference proof.) Several standard disciplines for using asynchronous message-passing can be viewed in terms of the invariants they preserve, which are particularly simple. One discipline was used above:
Restricting Postconditions of Receive Statements. An invariant describing the values of messages sent can be used to strengthen the proof of a process containing a receive r when the postcondition of r is in terms of the value of the message received and not in terms of the state of the sender.
Invariant Iv,l~ is such an invariant. Some other useful disciplines are now described.
Sometimes, execution of a receiver must be synchronized with a sending Again, this formula is not valid, so the proof must be strengthened.
Notice that x = 16 is true in process A starting from the time the message is sent to D. Therefore, the following is an invariant of A. To complete the proof, noninterference must be shown. Only the term x = 16 in post(r) in D might be invalidated by execution of process A. The statements in A that are parallel post(r) are the send and the assignment x := 16. It suffices to note that execution of neither of these invalidates post(r).
This example illustrates how, in addition to transferring values from sender to receiver, a receive facilitates the "transfer of a predicate"--in this case x = 16--• R.D. Schlichting and F. B. Schneider from the proof of the sender to the proof of the receiver. Clearly, transfer of a predicate must be done with care so that subsequent execution by the sender does not invalidate it. As shown above, one safe way to transfer a predicate is to make it a monotonic precondition of a send. (An assertion is monotonic if once it becomes true it remains so.) Above, x = 16 is implied by the precondition of the send in A and is also monotonic. Therefore, x = 16 will be true when the message is received, regardless of delivery delays. In general
Transfer of Monotonic Preconditions of Send Statements.
If P is a monotonic precondition of a send, then the following is an invariant:
Imono: "message not sent" V "P true"
This invariant can be used to strengthen the proof of a process containing receive r, in order to establish satisfaction when P appears in post(r).
The transfer of monotonic predicates is quite common. Sending an acknowledgment for a message m that has been received by D can be viewed as transferring the predicate m E PD from D to some other process. Once a message is a member of PD it remains so. Thus, m E PD is a monotonic predicate for any process.
Transfer of nonmonotonic predicates between processes is also possible, but the structure of the program must ensure the truth of the transferred predicate when the message is received. For example, consider the implications of allowing x to be changed after the message has been sent by process A in the program above. The transferred predicate would no longer be monotonic. Thus, A must be prevented from changing x until D has completed any processing requiring the truth of x ---16. To facilitate this, A will wait for an acknowledgement from D. The revised sequential proofs are 
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The satisfaction formulas for r and r' must now be shown valid. First, for r':
This is obviously valid. Sata~ynch(r) is
This is not valid, so we must strengthen the proof of D. In this example, satisfaction was established by strengthening assertions with an invariant based on the following protocol:
(1) Process A maintained the truth of the transferred predicate, x = 16, until after D finished any processing requiring the truth of x = 16, and (2) because A had no way of knowing exactly when D no longer required the truth of the transferred predicate, D sent a message--an acknowledgment--to communicate that fact.
The general strategy is
Nonmonotonic Predicates. A message can be used to transfer a predicate from process P8 to process Pr as long as P, ensures that the predicate is true at the time the message is received. This can be done by ensuring that the transferred predicate is true at the time the message is sent and remains true until Pr returns an acknowledgment to Ps. Thus P, maintains the following invariant: /,: "message not sent" V "acknowledgment received" V "transferred predicate true".
In summary, showing satisfaction for each of the protocols above was simplified by using an invariant to strengthen the proof of the receiver. The basis for such an invariant is that at all times either 
Relationship between Satisfaction and Noninterference
Establishing satisfaction for receive r is equivalent to proving that no process invalidates post(r). Therefore, one might expect this obligation to be superfluous, arguing that interference with post(r) by statement S should be detected when proving NIasy,ch (S, post(r)) in the noninterference proof. Unfortunately, because messages are buffered, a statement S in one process can interfere with post(r) even if S and r are not concurrent--that is, even if S cannot be executed immediately after r has completed. To see this, consider the following.
SELF :: x := 2;
Ix--2}
send 'x_is_two' to SELF; x := 3; {x=3} receive m when true; {m ='x_is_two' A x=2}
Here, process SELF sends a message to itself and then invalidates the transferred predicate (x = 2) before executing a receive. The sequential proof given above can be derived from our axioms. There is only one process, so noninterference is trivially established. Yet, the postcondition of the receive will not be true when the receive terminates. An attempt to establish satisfaction, however, will fail. (It is possible to construct similar pathologies for programs involving more than one process.) The example above also illustrates a common misconception about the origin of the "miraculous" postcondition of the receive. In Section 2.1 and [17] , the claim is made that anything can appear as the postcondition of a CSP communications command because such a statement will not terminate when executed in isolation. 9 However, our receive can terminate even when there is only a single process, as illustrated above. (Thus, the Unreliable Datagram Receive Axiom taken by itself is not sound; satisfaction and noninterference proofs are required to ensure soundness.) In general, it seems that a miraculous postcondition arises from the synchronization character of a statement. If a statement can cause an arbitrary delay awaiting an event that is in no way caused by execution of that statement, then the axiom for such a statement can have a miraculous postcondition. The phenomenon is not related to message passing at all. For example, consider the await statement await sem > 0 then sem := sem -1.
We are allowed to deduce pre("sem := sere -1") = sere > 0. This is miraculous because sere > 0 has nothing to do with the precondition of the await. The appearance of sem > 0 in the text of the await statement makes it easy to guess what the miracle might be, but sere > 0 is, nevertheless, a miracle. The major complication offered by message passing is that the miracle is often an assertion about the state of another process, which cannot be directly tested and therefore does not appear in the text of the receive.
COMMUNICATION WITH VIRTUAL CIRCUITS
A virtual circuit [23] is a communications channel with the following properties.
VC1. Messages are delivered reliably. VC2. Messages sent on a virtual circuit are delivered in the order sent.
Constructing concurrent programs using virtual circuits for communication and synchronization is considerably easier than for unreliable datagrams. For this reason, many communications networks provide support for virtual circuits.
A virtual circuit V can be viewed as a FIFO queue. The send statement • R.D. Schlichting and F. B. Schneider
Proof Rules
One of our goals in this paper is to show how proof rules for various messagepassing primitives can be derived. The proof rules in Section 3 were derived from "first principles"--that is, along the same lines as was done in [17] for synchronous message passing in CSP. In this section, we use a different approach--we derive proof rules from the proof obligations for a CSP program that simulates a virtual circuit. As before, proofs involve three steps: a sequential proof, a satisfaction proof, and a noninterference proof.
It is convenient to model a virtual circuit V in the following way. Variable av records the sequence of messages that have been sent on V and variable p v records the sequence of messages that have been received on V. Some useful operations on sequences sl and s2 are sl + val is the sequence that results by appending val to the end of sl. sl _< s2 is true ifsl is a prefix of s2. sl -s2 is the sequence obtained by deleting prefix s2 from the beginning of sl.
This expression is undefined if s2 is not a prefix of sl.
hd(sl) is the first element in sl. This expression is undefined if sl is empty. last(sl) is the last element of sl. This expression is undefined if sl is empty. Axioms for send and receive are derived from the axioms for the CSP commands used to simulate those statements. This is done in such a way that any proof using the axioms for send and receive can be translated into a proof of the CSP program that simulates the original.
The Virtual Circuit Send Axiom is derived as follows. For s', the CSP simulation of s in Pi, we have that No satisfaction obligation is incurred when using this axiom, because the satisfaction proof for the CSP simulation of send can always be derived from it. For r', the CSP simulation of r in P, we have from the Input Command Axiom that To establish satisfaction, construct Sat~ynch(r', s~):
(R h (av-pv)~¢ h Iv) ~ (Q h I-~m, pv V lhd(a v-Pv ),pv+hd(a v-Pv) .
With the unspecified predicates R and Q this is not necessarily valid. We now simplify Satsynch (r', s~) so that it is always possible to derive a satisfaction proof , I ), which is required in proving the CSP simulation of virtual circuits. As might be expected, NI_Sat~c(S, I) is the same as Sat~¢(S) when I A pre(S) is used for pre(S) and I is used for Q. Thus, to prove noninterference:
Virtual Circuits Noninterference Proof For every send and assignment S and every assertion I parallel to S, prove NLc(S, I).
For every receive S and every assertion I parallel to S, prove NI_Sat~c(S, I) valid.
At this point, it is instructive to compare our proof rules for unreliable datagrams with those for virtual circuits. The Network Axioms and axioms for send and receive in the two proof systems are almost identical. The significant difference is the interpretation of a and p--in one case they are multisets, in the other case they are sequences. The satisfaction formulas Satasynch and Sat~¢ are also similar. In fact, it is possible to make the two satisfaction formulas look identical by choosing "true" for/~ in Satasynch and defining an operation E on sequences as 11
MTEXT E (crv-pv) = (av -pv)~ ¢ cand MTEXT = hd(av-pv).
Finally, the noninterference proof obligations in the two proof systems differ only in the use of different satisfaction formulas when defining NI_Sat.
One apparent difference between the proof systems is that a and p are auxiliary variables in one and program variables in the other. Although a and p are program variables in the virtual circuit proof system, they are not directly accessible to the programmer; they are manipulated solely by executing send and receive. Thus, as in the unreliable datagram proof system, a and p can only appear in proofs, just as if they were auxiliary variables.
The similarity of the two proof systems is no accident. The unreliable datagram proof system could have been derived from the proof obligations for a CSP simulation of unreliable datagrams in much the same way as the virtual circuit proof system was. One way to implement this simulation is to employ a buffer process No for each process D. No will look very much like Nv; the major difference is the use of a choose function instead of hd. Consequently, a proof system derived from this simulation will be similar to the proof system derived in this section.
The similarity of the proof rules for the two systems should not be misunderstood. After receiving a message from a virtual circuit, it is possible to conclude that all messages sent prior to that message along that circuit have been received. This is not the case for unreliable datagrams. Thus, in the following program, which uses virtual circuits, it is possible to prove that the final value of m will be 2. With unreliable datagrams, messages may not be received in the order sent, and then, the most one can prove is that the final value of m will be 1 or 2. The difference in the semantics of the two types of message passing is embedded in the different interpretations of fl and p--in particular, ~ versus hd for selecting eligible values for MTEXT.
Example: A Merge Process
The following example is taken from [18] .
A process merge has two input channels inl and in2 and an output channel out. Merge expects to receive strictly increasing positive integers along inl and along in2; it outputs on channel out a merged list of these values. A value that appears in both inl and in2 is not duplicated in the output; the input streams are assumed to be terminated with the distinguished value % which is not output.
A program to implement merge is merge :: receive vl on inl; receive v2 on in2; do vl<v2 --*send vl on out; receive vl on inl Ovl>v2 --*send v2 on out; receive v2 on in2 D vl = v2 ¢oo --, send vl on out; 
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We choose as an invariant for the loop:
The loop terminates when vl = v2 = 0% and so from Inv we have that oo = last(pin1) and oo = last(pin2). No value is sent on inl or in2 after oo. Further, from the Virtual Circuit Network Axiom we have Pin~ <--ain~ and Pin2 ~ o.in2. We conclude that upon termination, P~n~ = o.inl and Pln2 = o.~n2. Thus, if Inv is a loop invariant, then when the loop terminates R will be true.
To show that Inv is a loop invariant, a sequential proof is constructed. • R.D. Schlichting and F. B. Schneider
The first conjunct MTEXT = last(pi,1 + MTEXT) of the consequent is equivalent to true; the second (v2 -last(pin2)) and fourth (incr(ao,t)) conjuncts are obviously implied by Inv in the antecedent.
In the third conjunct, the first disjunct is obviously false due to the presence of aout = sO + vl in the antecedent. However, the second disjunct is not. To see that MTEXT _> last(ao,t), recall that incr(ai,1) was given in the problem definition. Given that MTEXT = hd(ainl -pi,1), from the antecedent, we conclude MTEXT _ last(pin1). From Inv in the antecedent we have vl = last(pi,~), so MTEXT _> vl. Again, from Inv in the antecedent we have vl _ last(trout). Therefore, by transitivity MTEXT _> last(aout). The final part of this conjunct is directly implied by the antecedent.
To see that the fifth conjunct in the consequent is implied by the antecedent, substitute "sO + vl" (from the antecedent) for O'ou t.
Thus, satisfaction is established. Noninterference follows trivially.
As pointed out in [18] , it is possible to interconnect a number of these processes and construct a larger merge network. To prove properties of this larger network using our proof system, one merely needs to equate the names of connected channels.
RENDEZVOUS AND REMOTE PROCEDURES
Rendezvous is the basic mechanism for synchronization and communication in Ada 12 [15] . 13 It provides a disciplined way for processes to communicate and synchronize and can be easily implemented using message passing.
A rendezvous results from execution of a call statement by one process and a matching accept statement by another. Execution of call server.proc(in_args # out_args) by process client causes it to be delayed until a matching accept--an accept labeled proc in process server--is executed.
Execution of an accept statement proc: accept(in_parms # out_parms) body end in process server is as follows. Process server is delayed until some process executes a matching call; the in_parms are assigned the values of the corresponding in_args; body is executed; and then the out_args are assigned the values of the corresponding out_parms. Thus, execution is equivalent to in_parms :--in_args; body; out_args :--out_parms A remote procedure is like a procedure in a sequential programming language, except the procedure body is not necessarily executed by the caller; in particular, ~2 Ada is a registered trademark of the U.S. Department of Defense. ~3 In the following, a simplified version of the rendezvous mechanism in Ada is treated. For example, we do not consider conditional and timed entry calls, task failure and termination, or entry queues. 
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• 423 it may be executed by another process that is synchronized with the caller so that the usual semantics of the procedure call is achieved. Parameter transmission is by value-result since the procedure body may be executed on a processor different from the one on which the caller executes. Mesa contains remote procedures [20] . It is simple to implement remote procedures using call and accept statements. For a process client to invoke remote procedure server.proc, it executes call server.proc(in_args # out_args).
Remote procedure server.proc is implemented by a process server :: do true --* proc: accept(in_parms # out_parms) body end od Therefore, proof rules for call and accept can be used for reasoning about programs written in terms of remote procedures.
Proof Rules for Rendezvous
Proof rules for call and accept can be derived from the proof obligations for an operationally equivalent CSP program. 14 The call statement Provided procedure names are distinct, the communications commands in c' will match only commands in the process (server) corresponding to the simulation of an accept labeled proc, and communications commands in proc' will match only those corresponding to the simulation of a call naming server.proc.
We tentatively choose the following as the axiom for call.
14 Basically, the same translation as proposed by [8] • 425
The appearance of P' in (5.7) and (5.8) is a problem insofar as P' does not appear in the original proof--it is used to characterize an intermediate state of our CSP simulation of call. Clearly, our proof rules should be in terms of assertions that are derivable from the original proof. To mitigate this problem, we stipulate that P' be chosen so that ppin parma P ~ --i,:ar~ • (5.9) (Recall, anything can be used for P'.) This ensures that P' can be derived from assertions in the original proof. Choosing "true" for P' will always satisfy (5.9). However, usually P' will be a predicate describing some aspect of the caller's state that can be asserted both before and after the call. This allows a single proof of the body of an accept to be used for all call statements. We adopt the convention that both the precondition P of a call and the additional predicate P' used in satisfaction appear before that call in a sequential proof outline. A vertical bar ( I ) separates the two predicates, as in the following:
IR}
This is easily formalized by extending the syntax of the well-formed formulas of programming logic.
Formulas ( 
Rendezvous Noninterference Proof
For every assignment statement S and assertion I parallel to S, prove NIrndvs(S, I).
For every call S~u and matching accept S~cpt and every assertion I parallel to both S~all and Sa~pt, prove NI-Sat~ndv~(S~l, S~pt, I) valid.
Example: Producer/Consumer
Consider the following producer/consumer system. A producer process prod transfers the contents of an array A Clearly, this formula is valid. The proof that Sat,,d~s(c, ret) is also valid is left to the reader. The final step of the proof is to establish noninterference. First, consider statements in prod. No statement in prod interferes with any assertion in cons because prod changes no variable appearing in an assertion in cons. To see that statements in prod do not interfere with assertions in buffer, note that i is the only variable changed by prod that appears in assertions in buffer. However, pre(i := i + 1) ~ ~in_dep, and in_dep appears as a conjunct in every assertion I in buffer. Thus, pre(NIr,d~(S, I)) ~ in_dep h -~in_dep is false, and so NImd~s(S, I) is a theorem. For the call labeled p, NI-Sat~nd~8(p, dep, I) must also be proved of every assertion I in cons. This follows trivially because val and in_dep do not appear in any assertion in cons.
Similar reasoning shows that no statement in cons interferes with assertions in prod and buffer.
Lastly, we must show that no statement in buffer interferes with assertions in prod or cons. The only variables of concern here are ni and nj: they are changed in buffer and appear in assertions in the other processes. However, note that pre("ni := ni + 1") ~ in_dep. Since -~in_dep is a conjunct of every assertion in prod that mentions ni, interference is not possible. Similarly, pre("nj := nj + 1") in_ret and ~in_ret is a conjunct of every assertion in cons that mentions nj. Therefore, interference is not possible here, either.
RELATED WORK
Axioms for reasoning about reliable virtual circuits were first proposed in connection with Gypsy [11] . There, send and receive are characterized in terms of their effects on shared, auxiliary objects called buffer histories. The proof rules for send and receive are derived from the assignment axiom by translating these statements into semantically equivalent assignments to buffer histories. Because in Gypsy program variables manipulated by one process may not appear in assertions in the proof of another, there is no need to perform a noninterference proof. Unfortunately, this also restricts the class of programs that can be proved correct to those in which (only) values are transferred; programs in~ which predicates are transferred by message passing cannot be proved. Nevertheless, Gypsy has been successfully used to verify several large concurrent systems. Apt et al. define a proof system for reasoning about CSP programs [1] . In it, each process is proved in isolation with its communications commands deleted, and then a cooperation proof is performed to show that these proofs can be combined. The axioms for communications commands allow anything to be asserted as the postcondition of an input or output command, and the cooperation proof establishes that assumptions made in the postcondition of a communications command will, in fact, be true whenever execution of that command completes. Performing a cooperation proof involves constructing a global invariant that characterizes pairs of syntactically matching communications commands that can actually exchange a message during some computation (called semantic matching). The global invariant is in terms of program and auxiliary variables, but auxiliary variables may not be shared (in contrast to [17] ). Consequently, there is no need to construct a noninterference proof.
Proof systems based on the idea of a cooperation test have been defined for a variety of other programming notations, as well. A proof system for Distributed Processes [3] is presented in [10] . In [8] , a proof system for a subset of Ada containing rendezvous is defined and proved sound and complete; in [9] and [2] larger subsets of the concurrency features of Ada are axiomatized.
Proof systems based on cooperation ([1, 2, 8, 9, and 10]) differ from proof systems based on satisfaction ( [17] and the work in this paper) in two important regards. First, advocates of the cooperation approach do not allow shared auxiliary variables, arguing that they are inconsistent with the philosophy of a distributed system, where there is no shared storage. By prohibiting shared variables of any kind, noninterference need not be checked. Proponents of the satisfaction approach argue that shared auxiliary variables are convenient and that the noninterference obligation that arises from the use of shared variables is manageable if these shared variables are used in a disciplined manner. Moreover, there appear to be some language features that are most conveniently axiomatized by using shared variables. For example, Gerth and de Roever [9] suggest that Ada entry queues be modeled by shared variables, and thus to handle this feature using their proof system, some form of noninterference test would have to be added.
Secondly, in the cooperation approach a global invariant is furnished by the program prover as part of the cooperation proof. In order to construct the invariant, auxiliary variables may be added to each process. Assignments to these variables are then grouped with communications commands to form bracketed sections--the global invariant need not hold in bracketed sections. In contrast, in the satisfaction approach a mechanical procedure--the satisfaction formula--is given for constructing the global invariant. The programmer need not be concerned with defining bracketed sections. (However, to prove a satisfaction formula valid, the sequential proof might have to be strengthened by adding auxiliary variables.)
In fact, there is really a simple principle behind both the satisfaction and cooperation approaches: proving the invariance of an assertion [5, 16] . The approaches differ only in how the invariant is constructed and how it is partitioned. The differences are, nevertheless, significant--they affect how one thinks about a program when constructing its proof.
Another approach to designing a proof system for distributed programs is based on the use of traces [14, 18, 19, 22] . In this approach, processes and networks of processes are described in terms of their input/output histories, called traces. A program proof involves two steps. First, the trace of each process is characterized by using a programming logic in which input and output commands are modeled as assignments to traces. Then, proofs of processes are combined by using inference rules that relate these traces. Once the input/output history of a process or network is determined, reasoning can proceed in terms of assertions on traces, instead of assertions on program variables. This approach is particularly interesting because it allows one to reason about the result of combining a collection of components--processes or networks--without concern for their implementations.
CONCLUSION
Proof rules for asynchronous message-passing with unreliable datagrams, asynchronous message-passing with reliable virtual circuits, remote procedures, and rendezvous have been presented. The proof systems obtained are based on extending and applying the notion of a satisfaction proof. We have shown two approaches to obtaining the satisfaction obligations for a set of message-passing primitives: the obligations can be derived directly, or they can be derived from a CSP program that simulates the operation of the primitives.
The message-passing primitives we have considered are intended to be representative of the major approaches to synchronization and communication in distributed programs. As such, we have described and analyzed general constructs with the hope that existing mechanisms could then be modeled as instances of these representatives. For example, the syntax of send for unreliable datagrams requires that a destination process be explicitly named. However, the approach can be generalized to handle the case where a communications channel is named as a destination. It is also possible to handle the case where the destination in a send is computed at runtime using the technique described in [7] . Similarly, the inclusion of the client name in a remote procedure and of a server name in a remote procedure call was merely to allow mechanical construction of satisfaction formulas when these constructs are used. It is a simple matter to generalize our proof rules to the case where the client and server are not explicitly named (as in Ada) [8] .
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